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Abstract
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among
rms in vertically di¤erentiated markets. I rstly review some classical literature on collusion
between two rms producing goods of exogenous di¤erent qualities. I then extend the analysis
to a n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market to study the incentive to form either a whole
market alliance or partial alliances made of subsets of consecutive rms in order to collude in
prices. Within this framework I explore the price behaviour of groups of colluding rms and
their incentive to either pruning or proliferating their products. It is shown that a selective
pruning within the cartel always occurs. Moreover, by associating a partition function game
to the n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market, it can be shown that a su¢ cient condition for
the cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is is the equidistance of
rmsproducts along the quality spectrum. Without this property, and in presence of large
quality di¤erences, collusive agreements easily loose their stability. In addition, introducing a
standard innitely repeated-game approach, I show that an increase in the number of rms
in the market may have contradictory e¤ects on the incentive of rms to collude: it can make
collusion easier for bottom and intermediate rms and harder for the top quality rm. Finally,
by means of a three-rm example, I consider the case in which alliances can set endogenously
qualities, prices and number of variants on sale. I show that, in every formed coalition, (i)
market pruning dominates product proliferation and (ii) partial cartelisation always arises in
equilibrium, with the bottom quality rm always belonging to the alliance
Keywords: Vertically di¤erentiated market, price collusion, product pruning, product prolif-
eration, endogenous qualities, endogenous alliance formation, coalition structures, grand coali-
tion, coalition stability, core, simultaneous and sequential game of coalition formation.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, L1, L12, L13, L41.
1 Introduction
This survey primarily focusses on the incentives of rms to sign collusive agreements in verti-
cally di¤erentiated markets as, for instance, in cartels, mergers and alliances. It also studies
the e¤ects of collusion on market prices and qualities.
The relationship between mergers and price-quality combinations has recently attracted
increasing attention in empirical and theoretical I. O. literature.1 On the empirical ground,
Berry and Waldfogel (2001) found for instance a negative correlation between merging oper-
ations and number of existing radio stations with, in addition, an observed increase in radio
formats varieties related to mergers. Sweeting (2010) and George (2007) reported similar ev-
idence for U.S. radio music industry and Fan (2013) for U.S. newspapers market. In airline
industries, Peters (2006) observed a reduction of ight frequency in those market segments in
which merging carriers compete most, while Mazzeo (2003) showed a deterioration of on-time
performances following airline mergers.
In this chapter we introduce a number of game-theoretic tools which can be used to model
rm collusive agreements in vertically di¤erentiated markets. Section 2 quickly reviews the
initial literature on price collusion in two-rm di¤erentiated markets. Section 3 introduces a
n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market to study in more detail the incentives of rms to form
either the whole market cartel or partial cartels made of a subsets of adjacent rms in the
product space, with the aim to collude in prices. This exercise allows us to characterize the
price behaviour of alliances by looking, in particular, at the behaviour of what we denote,
in turn, bottom, intermediate and top cartels, with this meaning arbitrary cartels including,
respectively, the bottom or the top quality rm (in the bottom and top cartel, respectively) or
none of them (in the intermediate cartel). It can be shown that at the price equilibrium for any
top or intermediate cartel only two variants remain on sale from the cartel, the highest and the
lowest quality good produced by the cartel. On the other hand, in any bottom cartel, only one
variant remains on sale, namely the highest quality among those produced ex ante by the cartel.
The remaining sections focus on the stability of collusion. Section 4, by associating a partition
function game to the n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market shows as a su¢ cient condition for
the coalitional stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of all rmsqualities.
Without this feature, and in presence of highly asymmetric quality gaps, collusive agreements
may be easily become unstable. Section 5 introduces a standard innite horizon game to show
1Among the others, Mazzeo 2002, Crawford and Shum 2006, Gandhi et al. 2008, Draganska et al. 2009, Chu
2010, Byrne 2012, Fan 2013, Lee 2013.
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that an increase in the number of rms in the market may have contradictory e¤ects on the
incentive of rms to collude: collusion may become easier for bottom and intermediate rms
and harder for the top quality rm. Finally, in Section 6, by means of a three-rm example, I
consider the case in which colluding rms can also decide endogenously their quality and price
combinations. In such case, once merged, rms are allowed to optimally reshape their qualities
and prices according to the new market structure. From this, it can be checked whether full
or partial cartelisations can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game,
which now includes a coalition formation process taking place at the rst stage. For this model
we show that partial cartelisation always arises in equilibrium with the bottom quality rm
always belonging to the formed cartel. Section 7 concludes.
2 Collusion in a Vertically Di¤erentiated Duopoly
In his seminal paper Hackner (1994) analyses the relationship between collusion and vertical
product di¤erentiation in an innitely repeated duopoly framework. The main issue here is to
see whether price collusion is more or less likely to be sustained when the quality gap between
rmsproducts is higher. It is shown that the monopoly pricing is more easily reachable when
products are closer along the quality ladder. Also, among the two rms, the top quality rm
is the one possessing the highest incentive to break a collusive agreement. This is because
with a large quality gap the prot of the top quality rm is high even without collusion, and
this makes the incentive to collude for this rm weaker than for the bottom quality rm. In
a related paper, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) study how the stability of price collusion in
a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly can be a¤ected by the introduction of a minimum quality
standard. The presence of a welfare-maximizing minimum quality standard can make the
full collusive agreement harder to sustain. This is because the quality standard decreases
the product di¤erentiation providing the bottom quality rm with a stronger temptation to
defect.2
from the above analyses, two things can be noticed. The rst is that, in both models
considered above, the degree of product di¤erentiation does not change after a coalition has
formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to pricing. This assumption is a natural
entry point in the literature on cartel stability under product di¤erentiation, as it enables to
disentangle the e¤ect of quality gap on the stability of cartels. Further, conceiving collusion
in terms of pricing is particularly reasonable from a short-run perspective. Still, it leaves
2The contradictory results among the two papers mainly depends on their di¤erent cost assumtions.
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unexplored a companion question, namely the e¤ect of the cartel on product di¤erentiation.
This analysis could be particularly pregnant in a long-run perspective since one cannot exclude
that in a more extended time span a coalition (typically a cartel or a merger) entails structural
changes, such as relocations of production facilities, or adjustment in the product range and
quality.
The second is, instead, that in both papers the market is duopolistic and, as a result, any
cooperation between the two rms implies by denition a full market cartelisation. There
exist remarkable examples in which rms form partial alliances (i.e. those including a subset
of rms in the market) rather than the whole market coalition. Actually, In partial alliances
colluding rms can still compete against rival rms outside the coalition, and the e¤ects of
partial alliances or mergers are not equivalent to those observed when all rms mimic the
behaviour of a monopolist.
Lambertini (2000) explores how cartel stability can be connected to the R&D activity in
a duopoly in which the collusive quality choice may occur either under price or quantity-
setting behaviour.3 The issue concerning the alliance formation with more than two rms in
a vertically di¤erentiated market remain, however, unexplored, as also the e¤ect of partial
collusion on market equilibrium. Scarpa (1998) models a vertical di¤erentiation market with
three rms competing in quality and prices.4 In particular, he considers the role of a minimum
quality standard, and highlights how the demand level of each rm in a vertically di¤erentiated
market only depends on quality and price of adjacent rms in the product space. Indeed, since
only adjacent variants compete against each other, under partial collusion dening the optimal
set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization e¤ect that a variant
produced by the coalition exerts within the coalition with the possibility that this variant steals
consumers from the rival rms (stealing e¤ect).
Other related papers are those by Lommerud and Sorgard (1997), Gandhi et al. (2008),
Chen and Schwartz (2013) and Brekke et al. (2014), all devoted to the analysis of price-quality
post-merger re-positioning.5 The rst paper is inspired by Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) and it is devoted to evaluate the protability of a merger under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition. The authors assume that the market is initially populated
3A di¤erent strand of literature considers the possible impacts of R&D joint ventures on product market
collusion. See on this, Martin (1995), Lambertini et al. (2002) and Marini et al. (2014).
4 recently Pezzino (2010) develops the same model under quantity competition. Cesi (2010) studies the e¤ect
of two-rm mergers in a three-rm market in presence of a social-welfare maximizing minimum quality standard.
5Other recent papers by Mazzeo (2002), Einav (2003) and Seim (2006) look at the price-quality strategies
decided by industry entrants.
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by three rms and, therefore, two rms can merge and decide on the number of brands to mar-
ket. When the xed cost of marketing a brand is high, the merged entity reduces its product
range. This increases the protability of mergers both under Bertrand and Cournot competi-
tion due to reduced marketing costs. With a lowcost of marketing, the e¤ect on the product
range depends both on the nature of competition and on the degree of product di¤erentiation.
For example, under Cournot or Bertrand competition and su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products,
the non-merging rm nds protable to introduce a new brand, thereby damaging the merged
entity. In order to highlight the impact of a merger on non-price competition, Gandhi et al.
(2008) assume instead that rms can instantaneously and costlessly reposition their products
after a merger, thereby choosing both price and location in a Hotelling market. They show
that after a merger the products are repositioned away from each other to reduce the resulting
cannibalization e¤ect. Consequently, non-merging substitutes are repositioned between the
merged products and, after all these location strategies, the merged rms incentive to raise
prices decreases. Similarly, in a Hotelling framework, Chen and Schwartz (2013) analyse the
incentive for rms to introduce a product innovation when proposing a merger-to-monopoly.
In contrast to Arrows nding for process innovation, where the monopolist never undertakes
R&D e¤orts to innovate, in this paper the incentive to invest in incremental product innova-
tions can be higher for the merged entity (a monopolist) than for a rival facing competition
from the existing good. Indeed, the monopolist can coordinate the pricing of the two products
overcompensating the erosion of prots coming from cannibalization. In a spatial competition
model à la Salop with three ex ante identical rms, Brekke et al. (2014) show that any two-
rm merger reduces its product quality whereas the non-merging rm responds increasing its
quality. Final prices can either increase or decrease according to the responsiveness of demand
functions. Moreover, it is shown that if a merger entails the closure of one of the two merged
rms, this always leads to higher qualities and prices for all rms in the market.
3 Collusion in a n-rm Vertically Di¤erentiated Market
As underlined above, although easily interpretable, a two-rm vertically di¤erentiated market
possesses a few limitations and does not allow a full-edged analysis of market partial carteli-
sation. Therefore, in this rst modelling section we simply extend a traditional model à la
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) to a n-rm market in order to see
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the main implications in terms of pricing behaviour under collusion.6
Let n rms k = 1; 2; :::; n supply n di¤erent quality variants q1; q2; :::; qn with qk 2 (0;1)
and qn > qn 1 > ::: > q1 to a population of consumers. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) consumers are indexed by  and uniformly distributed in the
interval [0; ], with  < 1. As usual, the parameter  captures consumerswillingness to
pay for quality: the higher ; the higher the baseline utility gained when consuming variant
qk of the product. Each consumer can either buy one unit of a variant or not buying at all.
Formally, a simple way to represent consumers utility is
U() =
(
qk   pk when buying variant k
0 when not buying.
(1)
where pk is the price set by rm k, such that pk 2 [0; p], where 0 < p <1 is a given upper
bound on prices. From the above formulation, the marginal consumer buying variant k = 1 is
1 =
p1
q1
;
and the market is partially uncovered, with some consumers excluded from buying even the
bottom-quality variant. In general, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant k  1 and
k for k = 2; 3; :::; n is
k =
pk   pk 1
qk   qk 1 :
where pk > pk 1for every k = 1; 2; 3; :::; n. For the time being, we assume that product qualities
are exogenously given and we disregard costs to simplify calculations.7
When considering price competition, the payo¤s of all rms can be easily characterized
by describing the payo¤ of three types of rms in the quality spectrum: (i) top quality, (ii)
intermediate quality and (iii) bottom quality rm. The top quality rm (denoted k = n) sets
a price pn to maximize its prot
n = Dnpn =

   pn   pn 1
qn   qn 1

pn: (2)
6 In their seminal paper Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) introduce a n- rm model of vertically di¤erentiated
rms under the assumption of equispaced products.
7The existence of quality xed costs does not alter the nature of the results obtained here.
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Conversely, every intermediate rm k = 2; 3; :::; n  1 maximizes
k = Dkpk =

pk+1   pk
qk+1   qk  
pk   pk 1
qk   qk 1

pk: (3)
Finally, the bottom-quality rm (k = 1), maximizes
1 = D1p1 =

p2   p1
q2   q1  
p1
q1

p1: (4)
The optimal reply of every noncooperative rm can be easily obtained as follows:
pn(pn 1) =
1
2
(pn 1 + (qn   qn 1)) : (5)
for the top quality rm (k = n)
pk(pk 1; pk+1) =
1
2
pk 1(qk+1   qk) + pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1) : (6)
for every intermediate quality rm k = 2; 3; :::; n  1 and
p1(p2) =
1
2
p2q1
q2
(7)
for the bottom quality rm (k = 1).
Expressions (2)-(4) show that prices and qualities are strategic complements for all rms
( @
2
kk
@pk@qk
> 0) and the best-reply of every rm shifts outward as due to an increase in its quality.
On the other hand, for every rm k, an increase in the quality of direct rivalsproducts qj , for
j = (k + 1) and (k   1) causes a negative e¤ect on its prot ( @k@pk@qj < 0) and price-competition
becomes tougher as a result. Note also that, from (2)-(4), all rmsprot functions are concave
in their own prices and also their choice sets are compact and convex and their best-replies are
contractions,8 in such a way that the existence of a unique (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium
n-price vector p associated to the n variants (q1; q2; :::; qn) is guaranteed for any (nite) number
of rms competing in the market.9
8See Gabszewicz et. al (2016a).
9See, for instance Friedman (1991), p.84.
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3.1 Full price collusion
When rms form the whole market cartel, they can be assumed to maximize the sum of all
rmspayo¤s:
fNg =
nX
k=1
k = 1 + :::+ k 1 +k +k+1 + :::+n:
For every colluding rm k = 1; :::; n, the rst-order condition writes as10
@fNg
@pk
=
@k 1
@pk
+
@k
@pk
+
@k+1
@pk
= 0: (8)
Since the top quality-rm k = n in the cartel internalizes the payo¤ of its lower-quality neigh-
bour, its optimal reply writes as
pcn(pn 1) = pn 1 +

2
(qn   qn 1) : (9)
Along the same rationale, for all intermediate rms k = 2; 3; :::; (n  1) which are members of
the cartel, the optimal reply writes as
pck(pk 1; pk+1) =
pk 1(qk+1   qk) + pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1) ; (10)
since they internalize the payo¤ of their adjacent neighbour members of the cartel. Finally,
the optimal reply of the bottom quality rm k = 1 is given by
pc1(p2) =
q1
q2
p2: (11)
As already pointed out by Gabszewiz et al. (1986) and, more recently, by Gabszewicz et al.
(2016a), in a model in which unit costs vary only mildly with quality, under full price collusion
the n rms set prices pck such that their market shares are nil for all rms except for the top-
quality one (k = n). In particular, under full collusion, for every rm k = 1; 2; ::; n and j < k,
it is easy to obtain prices as
pck =
1
2

kP
j=1
(qj   qj 1): (12)
10Note that @
2N
@p2i
=   2(vi+1 vi 1)
(vi+1 vi)(vi vi 1)
< 0 for i = 2; 3; :::; n   1, and, therefore, the joint prot N is
concave in every rms price pi. The same condition holds for the two extreme rms along the quality spectrum,
i.e. i = 1 and i = n.
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Inserting (12) in every rms market share Dk, we obtain for the bottom quality rm,
D1(p
c
1; p
c
2) =

pc2   pc1
2
  p
c
1
1

=
 
1
2 (1 + 2)  121
2
 
1
21
1
!
= 0
where  j = (qj   qj 1) denotes the quality gap of every rm j selling goods of lower or equal
quality than rm k, and 1 = (q1   q0) = q1. Moreover, inserting (12) in every intermediate
quality rms market share k, we obtain:
Dk(p
c
k 1; p
c
k; p
c
k+1) =

pck+1   pck
k+1
  p
c
k   pck 1
k 1

=
=

1
2

P
jk+1 j  12
P
jk j
k+1
 
1
2

P
jk j  12
P
jk 1 j
k+1

=
=
 1
2
k+1
k+1
 
1
2
k
k

= 0:
with,
Dn(p
c
n 1; p
c
n) =

   p
c
n   pcn 1
qn   qn 1

=

  
1
2

P
jn j  12
P
jn 1 j
n

=
=

  
1
2
n
n

=
1
2
;
for the top quality rm. Thus, when colluding together all rms cover only half of the market
and the whole market payo¤ is:
fNg =
P
k2N

fNg
k =
nP
k=1
pckDk =
1
4
2n: (13)
3.2 Partial cartels
In many cases rms can organize themselves in a coalition structure (partition) of the N
rms di¤erent from the grand coalition, C = (S1; S2; :::; Sm), with m  n. However, in a
vertically di¤erentiated market every rm can e¤ectively distort prices by colluding either
with its left (lower quality) or with right (higher quality) or with both its local competitors.11
In what follows we introduce a few simple denitions helping to develop the analysis of partial
cartelisation. In order to a¤ect prices, rms can form bottom, intermediate or top quality
cartels. To each of these members, the rst order condition of prot maximization writes as:
11Price collusion can also occur among disconnected rms, but in this case the prices of the rms will just be
equal to those arising at the noncooperative equilibrium.
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(i) in the case of interior cartel members:
@S
@pk
=
@
X
k2S k
@pk
=
@k 1
@pk
+
@k
@pk
+
@k+1
@pk
= 0;
leading to the optimal reply function
ppck (pk 1; pk+1) =
pk 1(qk+1   qk) + pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1) , (14)
where the superscript pc stands for partial collusion.
(ii) In the case of lower boundary cartel member:
@S
@pk
=
@
X
k2S k
@pk
=
@k
@pk
+
@k+1
@pk
= 0;
leading to the best-reply function
ppck (pk 1; pk+1) =
1
2pk 1(qk+1   qk) + pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1) : (15)
(iii) Finally, in the case of upper boundary cartel member:
@S
@pk
=
@
X
k2S k
@pk
=
@k
@pk
+
@k 1
@pk
= 0;
leading to the best-reply function
ppck (pk 1; pk+1) =
pk 1(qk+1   qk) + 12pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1) : (16)
Denition 1 (i) A bottom cartel SB  N is a coalition formed by any number of consecutive
intermediate rms k = 2; :::; n   1, also including the bottom quality rm k = 1. (ii) An
intermediate cartel Sk  N is a coalition formed by more than two consecutive intermediate
rms k = 2; :::; n   1. (iii) A top cartel ST  N is a coalition formed by any number of
consecutive intermediate rms k = 2; :::; n  1, also including the top quality rm k = n.
Following Gabszewicz et al. (2016a), the next proposition characterizes the market shares
of rms belonging to a: (i) intermediate cartel; (ii) bottom cartel; (iii) top cartel.
Proposition 1 (i) A bottom cartel only produces in equilibrium the top quality variant among
those in the cartel. (ii) Any intermediate cartel only produces in equilibrium the top and the
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bottom quality variants among those in cartel. (iii) Any top cartel only produces in equilibrium
the top and the bottom quality variants among those in the cartel.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 In a generic partition of the n rms P = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) organized in m < n
non trivial cartels, a total of 2m + (n  z)   1 (resp. 2m + (n  z)) variants are put on
sale in the market when the partition includes (resp. does not include) the bottom cartel, for
z = s1 + s2 + :::+ sm, where sj, for j = 1; 2; :::;m, denotes the cardinality of every cartel.
In order to complete the characterization of every partial cartelisation of the market we
can provide a price comparison for all rms under partial cartelisation with respect to both
fully noncooperative and fully collusive cases.
Proposition 2 Under partial cartelisation the rms set prices ppck higher or equal than the
corresponding prices pk charged at the noncooperative price equilibrium and lower than the
corresponding full collusive prices pck.
Proof. Let us assume, for simplicity, that only one cartel S  N has formed, and that
the remaining rms play as singletons. Note, however, that the same reasoning would apply
to the case with more than one cartel. It can be easily checked that the joint prot of an
arbitrary cartel S is continuous and concave with respect to every rms price pk, for k 2 S.
Moreover, the optimal reply of every partially collusive rm k 2 S is a contraction and, hence,
a unique partially collusive price prole ppc exists for any given level of qualities q1; q2; :::qn,
under the assumption that all rms with unsold goods set their equilibrium prices exactly at
the levels for which the sales become nil.12 Thus, we can: (a) start with a prole pof Nash
equilibrium prices. (b) Let the rms in S  N reply according to their optimal collusive
replies. A quick comparison between optimal replies under partial cartelisation (??)-(??) and
purely noncooperative Nash equilibrium shows that the former are always steeper than the
latter and, since they are in both cases positively sloped, all rms in the cartel will set higher
prices than in the noncooperative scenario. (c) Similarly an increase in prices will also occur
to all rms in the fringe playing noncooperatively: given the higher prices of the cartel, they
will respond, in turn, increasing their prices. (d) The described adjustment process, given the
contraction property of all rmsoptimal replies, will converge to a new prole of prices such
that ppck > p

k for all k = 1; 2; :::; n. Inequality p
c
k > p
pc
k , for every k = 1; 2; :::; n, can be proved
along similar lines.
12Any higher price would be equally optimal since these goods are not purchased by consumers.
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4 A Cooperative Approach to the Stability of the Whole In-
dustry Agreement
In this section we consider the incentive of rms to form the whole industry cartel (grand
coalition). Following Gabszewicz et al (2016b), a partition function game can be associated to
the vertically di¤erentiated market introduced in Section 3 and, from this, it can be proved
that the core of this game is nonempty when the qualities of the products sold by the rms
are equispaced along the quality spectrum. Moreover, it can be easily shown that, when
this regularity condition does not hold, the core can be empty. Thererfore, a fully collusive
agreement among rms is more easily reachable when there are neither too large nor too
asymmetric gaps between rmsqualities. The symmetry in quality gaps helps to maintain the
discipline of thewhole market cartel just because it reduces the incentive of rms to free-ride
by leaving the agreement.
Following Gabszewicz et al. (2016b) we adopt the concept of delta core by Hart and
Kurz (1983), also denoted projection core in the recent axiomatization by Bloch and van den
Nouweland (2014). Since for the case of vertically di¤erentiated markets the coalitional worth
possesses positive coalition externalities,13 the delta or projection-core is the smallest core and,
therefore, its existence implies the existence of all other possible versions of core in games with
simultaneous moves.14
To prove our result we can formally associate to the vertically di¤erentiated market de-
scribed above a partition function game P = (N; v (S;C)), where N is the set of rms and
v(S;C) 2 R+ is the worth associated to every coalition of rms S  N belonging to a coalition
structure C 2 C. In our model, when a cartel S  N forms, its maximal coalitional payo¤
is obtained when the remaining rms in NnS stick together in the complementary coalition
fNnSg. Therefore, if the core of the partition function game P exists when the coalitional
worth v(S;C) is computed for C = (S;NnS), it will a fortiori exist for any other partition of
the rms in NnS.
13This means that every rm is advantaged when rivals merge in coalitions
14Gabszewicz et al (2016b) use this notion of core in order to provide the strongest core existence result.
Demanges (1994) provides general conditions for core existence in economies producing di¤erentiated goods,
although in absence of externalities between coalitions. Zhao (2013) examined the existence of -, - and -core
in a three-rm linear Cournot oligopoly with di¤erent marginal costs. In a di¤erentiated quantity oligopoly with
three (or four rms) Watanabe and Matsubayashi (2013) show that for any degree of product di¤erentiation the
 core is nonempty while the -core only exists in presence of high product di¤erentiation. For a more detailed
account of the works dealing with coalitional agreements in oligopoly games, see Marini (2009) and Currarini
and Marini (2015).
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Denition 2 The core of partition function game P = (N; v (S;C)) consists of all e¢ cient
payo¤ allocations  2 RjN j+ respecting
P
k2S k  v (S;C) for all S  N and for all partition
C 2 C to which S may belong to.
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Let market variants q1; q2; :::; qn be equispaced with (qk   qk 1) =  2 (0;1)
for all k = 1; 2; :::; n, with q0 = 0. Then, the core of the partition function game P =
(N; v (S;C)) associated to the n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market is nonempty.
The proof of this result, contained in Gabszewicz et al. (2016b), is constructive and it nds
a specic allocation of the monopoly prot fNg such that neither an individual rm nor a
bottom, intermediate or top cartel have an incentive to leave the grand coalition under its max-
imal expectation, i.e. that the remaining rms continue to collude inside the complementary
cartel NnS. Such allocation is simply
 =

s1
fNg; s2fNg; :::; snfNg

(17)
where sk for k = 1; 2; :::; n are shares of the monopoly prot given by
sk =

fk;Nnkg
fkgP
k2N 
fk;Nnkg
fkg
;
such that
P
k2N sk = 1, where 
fk;Nnkg
fkg is the prot of every rm k when in competition with
its complementary coalition Nn fkg.
As the simple example below shows, when the quality gaps among rms widely di¤er, the
core can be empty.
4.1 An Empty Core Example
Let us assume four rms in the market, i .e. N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, initially selling four di¤erent
qualities q1, q2, q3, q4. Let now the rms fully collude by forming the grand coalition. Let
now the top cartel ST = f2; 3; 4g decide to leave the grand coalition and coalition structure
C = (f1g ; f2; 3; 4g) form as a result. In this case, the top cartel obtains:

(f1g;f2;3;4g)
T =
2q2q3 (q3   q2)
(4q3   q2)2
+
1
4
2 (4q2q4   q1q4   3q1q2)
(4q2   q1) :
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For  = 1, q1 = 1, q2 = 5 and q4 = 10 and q3 > 7: 26, the quality gap between q2 and q3 (both
produced inside the cartel) becomes su¢ ciently high for

(f1g;f2;3;4g)
T +
(f1g;f2;3;4g)
1 > 
fNg
N =
1
4
2q4 = 2:5
and the core is, therefore, empty. If all products are equipaced, with q1 = 2:5, q2 = 5, q3 = 7:5
and q4 = 10,

(f1g;f2;3;4g)
1 +
(f1g;f2;3;4g)
T = 2:21 < 
fNg
N :
Moreover, it can be checked that all other feasible deviations by single or coalitions of rms do
not improve upon the grand coalition allocations. Core existence is, in such a way, guaranteed.
5 A Noncooperative Approach to the Stability of the Whole
Industry Agreement
In this section we test the stability of the whole industry cartel using a standard repeated-game
approach. For this purpose, we use the model with equispaced variants, which is su¢ ciently
tractable.15
We already obtained in Section 3 the monopoly payo¤. What is required to characterize the
standard grim strategy of a standard innite-horizon extension of the vertically di¤erentiated
model is to make explicit the noncooperative equilibrium payo¤s of all rms and, as a second
aspect, to dene their defection payo¤s obtained when playing their best-replies when all other
rivals collude. Finally, an intuitive allocation rule has to be introduced to divide the fully
collusive payo¤ among the n heterogeneous rms. In what follows we derive the price vector
obtained at the Nash equilibrium of every constituent game under the equispaced product
assumption.
Proposition 4 Let market variants q1; q2; :::; qn be equispaced and such that qk  qk 1 =  for
every k = 1; 2; :::; n, with q0 = 0. Then, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium price vector for
all rms k = 1; 2; :::; n is given by:
pk =

 
bk1   bk2

p
3bn1 +
p
3bn2
;
and for b1 =
 
2 +
p
3

and b2 =
 
2 p3 :
15 In this section we use part of the material contained in Bos and Marini (2016).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
If we assume the existence of quadratic quality costs for each rm c(qk) =
q2k
2 , their nonco-
operative payo¤s can be written as
k =

pk+1   pk

  p

k   pk 1


pk  
q2k
2
=
2
3
2
 
bk1   bk2
2
(bn1 + b
n
2 )
2  
(k)2
2
:
Now, since the fully collusive price under equally spaced variants is, for every rm k = 1; 2; :::; n
pck =
1
2
k;
we can easily characterize the fully collusive prot of every rm (before any transfer takes
place) as
ck =
2 (k)
4
  (k)
2
2
:
One way to devide the fully collusive prot among all rms is to use the following natural
quality-ranking:
rk = k  
for every k = 1; 2; :::; n, which substantially corresponds to the position of each rm in the
equispaced quality space.Therefore, using the fact that
P
k=1;:::;n
rk =
n(n+ 1)
2
at the fully collusive agreement we can simply assign to every rm a personalised share equal
to:
k =
rkP
k=1;:::;n rk
=
2k
n(n+ 1)
:
Finally, using every rms noncooperative best-replies we can easily obtain every rms
defection prot as:
d1 =

pc2   2pd1


pdk  
2
2
=

1
2
(2) 2( 14 )


1
4
   
2
2
=
1
8
2   
2
2
;
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
dk =
 
pck+1   2pdk + pck 1

!
pdk  
((k))2
2
=
(k)22
8
  ((k))
2
2
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
dn =
 
   p
d
n   pcn 1

!
pdn  
(n)2
2
=
(n+ 1)2 2
16
  (n)
2
2
:
14
Thus, for the full collusion to be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
innite horizon game (via a grim strategy) the discount factor of every rm has to respect the
following condition
k(;  ; n)  
d
k   kck
dk  k
=

(k)2
8 
2   ((k))22

  2(k)n(n+1)

2n
4   (n)
2
2

(k)2
8 
2   23
2

(b1)
k   (b2)k
2
((b1)
n + (b2)
n)2
(18)
for all k = 1; 2; :::; n  1 and
n(;  ; n)  
d
n   ncn
dn  n
=

n22
8   (n)
2
2

  2nn(n+1)

2n
4   (n)
2
2

(n+1)2
16 
2   23
2 ((b1)
n   (b2)n)2
((b1)
n + (b2)
n)2
(19)
for k = n.16 From the above expressions, the following proposition follows.
Proposition 5 Let market variants q1; q2; :::; qn be equispaced with qk   qk 1 =  for every
k = 1; 2; :::; n and q0 = 0. Let also every rms share of the monopoly prot be determined
by its quality ranking, as k = 2 (k) =n(n + 1). Then, an increase in the number of rms n
reduces the discount factor sustaining the fully cooperative agreement as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the innitely repeated game via a grim strategy for all rms k = 1; 2; 3; :::; n  1,
while it increases the discount factor of the top quality rm k = n (for n > 3).
Proof. This can be obtained from straightforward manipulations of expressions (10)-(11).
Proposition 5 helps to see that, in vertically di¤erentiated markets, under equispaced vari-
ants, an increase in the number of rms has contradictory e¤ects on the incentive of rms to
collude: it makes collusion easier to sustain for bottom and for intermediate quality rms but,
at the same time, it makes it harder for the top quality rm. This result is somehow surprising
if compared to the usual view that collusion is more easily sustainable when the number of
rms is small, whereas it becomes usually harder when the number of rms increases.
16Note that a constraint for  >
p
n
p
2 must be imposed for both collusive and noncooperative rmspayo¤s
to be nonnegative.
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6 Mergers and Alliances with Endogenous Qualities
To the best of our knowledge, a full-edged theoretical study of the e¤ects of alliances and
mergers on market prices and qualities in a vertically di¤erentiated industry with more than
two rms has not yet been provided. Similarly unexplored is the analysis of mergers stability
between rms in vertically di¤erentiated markets when rms can re-shape prices and quali-
ties of the products after mergers. Anecdotal evidence shows that mergers and acquisitions
often occur among rms selling fairly di¤erentiated products along the quality spectrum. For
instance, some of the mergers taking place after 1979 deregulation of U.S. airline market, oc-
curred between one big national/international carrier and one low fare local carrier (e.g. the
merger between American Airlines and AirCal in 1986 or between Delta and Atlantic South-
east Airlines in 1999)17 or, alternatively, just between intermediate-quality carriers (as for
Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways in 2010 or between Republic Airways and Midwest
Airlines in 2009). Analogously, the European Airlines industry has witnessed a high number of
mergers occurring between broadly di¤erentiated airlines as, for instance, between Air France
and Air-Inter in 1999 or between Lufthansa and Air Dolomiti in 2003.18
In a similar vein, the automotive industry is plenty of examples of premium car producers
taking over economy car manufacturers, as in the merger occurring between Volkswagen Group
and Skoda in 1991 or between Nissan and Renault in 1999.
One consequence of these consolidation processes is often which to re-position the lower
quality brand towards a higher segment of the market or, in some other cases, to un-brand
intermediate quality products as to create a ghting brand able to compete more aggressively
with the rms positioned at the bottom of the quality spectrum. However, the latter strategy
appears usually more as a temporary than a permanent strategy, since a ghting brand may
risk to cannibalize the market of the merging rms. Ultimately, a consolidated group can
nd more advantageous to re-brand its economy products rather than un-brand some of its
intermediate quality outlets. Instead of letting Smart for Two competing in the low segment of
the market, Daimler-Benz preferred to transform this city car into a premium car. Similarly, the
boom of mergers recently observed in pharmaceutical industries, involving top pharmaceutical
companies acquiring generics drugs manufacturers (as in the recent case of Teva absorbing
Allergan Generics), could have represented a similar trend.19
17See: http://www.airlines.org.
18 In some other cases the low-cost airlines have attempted to take over small-medium airlines, as in the recent
hostile takeover launched by Ryanair to Air Lingus.
19See, for instance, Wieczner (2015),
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In Gabszewicz et al. (2015) we introduce a simple framework in which three ex ante
heterogeneous rms, initially producing three vertically di¤erentiated goods, low (rm 1),
medium (rm 2) and high (rm 3), enter a negotiation to decide whether to merge or not with
some or all rival rms and, once merged, optimally reshape the qualities and prices according
to the new market structure.
Assume as in Gabszewicz et al. (2015) a three-stage game where, at the rst stage, every
rm expresses its willingness to form an alliance or, alternatively, to stay as singleton. Then,
at the second and third stage each formed coalition can decide, in turn, the qualities and
prices of its goods. An alliance can either contains all rms in the market (grand coalition), as
N = f1; 2; 3g or, alternatively, be formed by a nonempty subset S  N of rms, with S 2 N ,
where N = 2Nn f?g is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the N rms:
N = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g) :
Thus, the set C of all coalition structures C which can be formed by the three rms is:
C = ((f1g ; f2g ; f3g) ; (f1; 2g ; f3g) ; (f1g ; f2; 3g) ; (f1; 3g ; f2g) ; (f1; 2; 3g)) :
The game can be solved backward to analyse the prices and qualities selected in equilib-
rium by rms under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate
coalition structure has formed at the rst stage. As in Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra
(1999), the coalition formation game can be assumed sequential, with an exogenous order of
play. Di¤erently from them, since rms are ex ante heterogeneous, it is assumed that every
rm proposes not only an alliance, but also a division of the coalition payo¤. Each recipient
of the proposal can either accept or reject the o¤er and, in case of rejection, it becomes its
turn to make a proposal. The game is assumed nite-horizon and every rm only possesses
one turn of proposal at each period.20
Since prices and qualities are selected in a sequence by every formed coalition, the payo¤s
accruing to a rm or a coalition in each feasible coalition structure can be easily obtained as
follows:
20Both Blochs (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) model a innite-horizon negotiation process.
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(f1g ; f2g ; f3g) 1 = 0:00005 2 = 0:00124 3 = 0:02348
(f1; 2; 3g) fNg(f1;2;3g) = 0:03125
(f1; 2g ; f3g) (f1;2g;f3g)f1;2g = 0:00152 
(f1;2g;f3g)
3 = 0:02443
(f1; 3g ; f2g) (f1;3g;f2g)f1;3g = 0:02443 
(f1;3g;f2g)
2 = 0:00152
(f1g ; f2; 3g) (f1g;f2;3g)1 = 0:00152 (f1g;f2;3g)f2;3g = 0:02443
Table 1 - Firm payo¤s in every coalition structure.
It turns out that, although the qualities and prices arising in each partial merger do not
vary, the prots accruing to rms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong
(compete).
Moroever, using the above payo¤s, it can be shown that, although the full monopolization
of the market is the most protable outcome of the game, in a nite-horizon sequential game
of coalition formation the incentive for rms to enter a whole industry merger is dominated by
that to form partial mergers. In particular, the nite-horizon sequential coalition formation
game reaches the results described by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) When the high quality rm 3 is the initiator of the sequential coalition for-
mation game, the only stable coalition structure is C12:3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g), where rm 3 continues
to produce the top variant q3 and the two remaining rms 1 and 2 only market intermediate
variant q2. (ii) When rm 2 is the initiator of the game, the only stable coalition structure is
C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g), where rm 1 and 3 jointly produce top variant q3 and rm 2 produces
intermediate variant q2. (iii) Finally, when rm 1 is the initiator of the game, the only stable
coalition structure is C12:3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g), where rm 3 produces top variant q3 and 1 and 2
jointly produce intermediate variant q2.
Proof. See Gabszewicz et al. (2015).
Notice that, both in (i) and (ii) the initiator of the game never belongs to an alliance in
equilibrium. Indeed, the payo¤ of a rm when it remains singleton (rationally expecting that
the other rms will prefer to merge) dominates that of being part of the grand coalition, since
in the latter case the distribution of prots would be unfavourable to the initial proposer.
The equilibrium prot accruing to either rm 2 or 3 when initiating the game and competing
against an alliance is, therefore, larger than when they are part of the alliance. The optimal
strategy is, therefore, to induce the remaining rms to merge. A di¤erent result arises when
rm 1 (the bottom quality one) begins the negotiation process. In this case, rm 1 cannot
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credibly commit to remain independent since the remaining rms (2 and 3) prefer to play as
singletons than forming an alliance (see Table 1). This is due to the fact that the alliance
between rm 2 and 3 is problematic since in this circumstance 2 would optimally leapfrog the
bottom quality rm, ending up by sharing the top quality rms duopoly payo¤, which is lower
than the sum of rmsprots under triopoly. Knowing in advance the infeasibility of coalition
f2; 3g, rm 1 would prefer to let rm 3 playing independently and, then, form an alliance with
rm 2.
A striking result of this model is that all equilibrium mergers always contains the bottom
quality rm which, in all cases, drops its low-quality variant from the market. In particular,
whoever is the additional player included in a coalition (either the intermediate or the top
quality rm), equilibrium prices and qualities always coincide with that observed in the case of
a duopoly, with a high-quality rm competing against a low-quality rival, as in Motta (1992).
At rst sight, this result seems to be counterintuitive. A natural conjecture would be that
either the range of variants or the quality gap between variants in the market would change
with the players involved in the alliance. This model shows instead that only prots accruing to
the single rms change with the type of partial merger, range of products, quality gap and price
being unchanged. Indeed, the cannibalization e¤ect and the stealing e¤ect induce the merger,
whatever its members, to withdraw from the market the lowest quality variant between the
set which can be produced a priori. Interestingly, depending on the intensity of these e¤ects,
in some circumstances this variant is withdrawn from the market at the price stage, in some
other circumstances at the quality stage. In particular, the merger formed by the intermediate
quality and by the low-quality rm stops immediately to market the bottom-quality product
at the price stage. In contrast, the merger formed by the top and the bottom-quality rm
keeps the bottom product (as a ghting brand) at the price stage whereas ultimately drops
it at the quality stage. As argued above, keeping a ghting brand in an alliance is mostly
a short-run (price) than a medium/long run strategy (quality) and it is, therefore, dropped
when the merging group can re-position its product lines. Finally, it is found that, in all
equilibrium (partial) mergers, the bottom-quality rm is always present. This appears in
line with numerous theoretical and experimental studies on coalition formation in triads of
heterogeneous individuals, i.e. possessing di¤erent skills or ghting ability (e.g. Caplow 1956,
1959, 1968, Vinacke and Arko¤ 1957, Gamson 1961). A central conclusion of these studies is
that weakness is strength(see, for instance, Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011, p.189), with this
meaning that less-powered individuals have usually more chances to be part of a coalition.
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The results of this coalition formation game conrms that the most likely mergers occur
between intermediate and bottom-quality producers, with the premium quality brands prefer-
ably running alone. This is the case of some top car producers (as, for instance, Daimler-Benz)
whose only participation is in a few specic projects. What the model results also indicate,
is that mergers between intermediate and bottom quality rms, as those occurred between
Volkswagen and Skoda, or between Fiat and Chrysler in the automotive industry, should be
the norm. In these cases the intermediate quality product is withdrawn from the market,
which can be interpreted saying that of all products sold by the merger have a tendency to
converge towards the same level of quality of their premium brand products. The model also
stresses how also the mergers between top and bottom quality rms are likely, as for instance
those recently occurred between generics pharmaceutical manufacturers and premium brand
pharmaceutical companies. The model results just suggest that in this case the bottom quality
products can be protably retired from the market to soften the competition among remaining
goods.
7 Concluding Remarks
The rationale underlying many of the result presented in this paper can be found in the nature
of competition among vertically di¤erentiated rms. Indeed, in any cartel or merger, the
optimal set of products to market is dened by balancing the cannibalization e¤ect within
the coalition with the stealing e¤ect occurring between a coalition and the rms outside.
It was shown that the bottom quality variant in a group of colluding rms is kept on sale
in the market only when such a cartel needs it as a sort of ghting brand to protect itself
from all lower quality variants sold by the fringe of competitors. In any other case a cartel
prefers to withdraw from the market all its low quality variants. In this way rms can soften
price competition in the market and magnify the quality di¤erentiation between the variants
remained on sale. This view seems in line with the empirical ndings, where mergers emphasize
"product di¤erentiation" among merging rms as well as with respect to their outside rivals.
Partial mergers can, therefore be viewed as a means to enhance the dynamic competition for
the market and to reduce the static competition in the market.
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8 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Gabszewicz et al. 2016a). Take a generic intermediate cartel of
h  n  2 rms initially selling variants
qk; qk+1; qk+2; :::; qk+h
and competing, both with a left-hand fringe of independent rms selling lower quality vari-
ants q1; q2; :::; qk 1 and with a righ-hand fringe selling, alternatively, higher quality variants
qk+h+1; qk+h+2; :::; qn. Using expressions (14)-(16) the optimal-replies of the rms in the cartel
are
ppck (pk 1; pk+1) =
1
2pk 1(qk+1   qk) + pk+1(qk   qk 1)
(qk+1   qk 1)
ppck+1(pk; pk+2) =
pk(qk+2   qk+1) + pk+2(qk+1   qk)
(qk+2   qk)
ppck+2(pk+1; pk+3) =
pk(qk+3   qk+2) + pk+3(qk+2   qk+1)
(qk+3   qk+1)
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ppck+h(pk+h 1; pk+h+1) =
pk+h 1(qk+h+1   qk+h) + 12pk+h+1 (qk+h   qk+h 1)
qk+h+1   qk+h 1 :
where only the two extreme rms k and k + h in the cartel are directly competing with
the rms outside. Without loss of generality, take a generic rm inside the cartel producing
an intermediate variant (i.e neither the bottom nor the top quality within the cartel), say
rm k + 1. Using both the optimal reply of rm k + 1 and those of the rms connected to it
(i.e. rms k and k + 2) and re-arranging, we obtain the optimal replies of these three rms as
functions of pk 1 and pk+3 only.
~pk = p
pc
k (pk 1; pk+3) =
1
2
pk 1 (qk+3   qk) + 2pk+3(qk   qk 1)
qk+3   qk 1 ;
~pk+1 = p
pc
k+1(pk 1; pk+3) =
1
2
pk 1(qk+3   qk+1) + 2pk+3(qk+1   qk 1)
qk+3   qk 1 ;
~pk+2 = p
pc
k+2(pk 1; pk+3) =
1
2
pk 1(qk+3   qk+2) + 2pk+3(qk+2   qk 1)
qk+3   qk 1 :
Using the above, we can easily compute the optimal market share of rm (k + 1) as
Dk+1(~pk; ~pk+1; ~pk+2) =
~pk+2   ~pk+1
qk+2   qk+1  
~pk+1   ~pk
qk+1   qk = 0
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which proves that under partial collusion every intermediate rm of an intermediate cartel
obtains zero market share. Repeating now the same procedure for the rm producing the
lowest quality in the cartel (here rm k), we obtain instead that
Dk(~pk; ~pk+1; ~pk 1) =
~pk+1   ~pk
qk+1   qk  
~pk   ~pk 1
qk   qk 1 =
1
2
~pk 1
(qk   qk 1) > 0
for ~pk 1 > 0. Finally, computing the optimal replies of the highest quality rm in the cartel,
i.e. rm (k + h), and of the rms directly connected to it, we obtain
~pk+h 1(pk+h 2; pk+h) =
pk+h 2(qk+h 1   qk+h 2) + pk+h (qk+h 1   qk+h 2)
qk+h   qk+h 2
~pk+h(pk+h 1; pk+h+1) =
pk+h 1(qk+h+1   qk+h) + 12pk+h+1 (qk+h   qk+h 1)
qk+h+1   qk+h 1
~pk+h+1(pk+h; pk+h+2) =
1
2
pk+h(qk+h+2   qk+h+1) + pk+h+2 (qk+h+1   qk+h)
qk+h+2   qk+h :
Using the above,
Dk+h(~pk+h 1; ~pk+h; ~pk+h+1) =
~pk+h+1   ~pk+h
qk+h+1   qk+h  
~pk+h   ~pk+h 1
qk+h   qk+h 1 =
=
1
2
~pk+h+1
(qk+h   qk+h 1) > 0.
showing that only the variants produced by the two rms at the extremes of this (generic)
intermediate cartel are sold at prices implying positive market shares. Exactly the same pro-
cedure proves that, in a top cartel, only the highest and the lowest quality variants initially
sold by the cartel remain on sale.
Finally, let us consider a bottom cartel, i.e. a cartel formed by rms 1; 2; :::; h initially selling
h variants q1; q2; ::::qh and competing with (n  h) independent rms selling the higher quality
variants qh+1; qh+2; :::; qn. Again, we can apply the same argument used above to show that
every rm in the interior of the cartel (i.e neither selling the lowest quality nor the highest
quality variant in the cartel) obtains zero market share. Also, for the top quality rm in the
cartel (here rm h), we obtain that Dh(~ph; ~ph 1; ~ph+1) > 0: Finally, when considering a rm
selling the lowest quality variant in any bottom cartel, its market share simply writes as:
D1(p2; p1) =
p2   p1
q2   q1  
p1
q1
;
that, using rms 1 optimal collusive reply ppc1 (p2) =
q1
q2
p2, becomes
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D1(p2; ~p1) =
p2   q1q2 p2
q2   q1  
q1
q2
p2
q1
= 0;
showing that, di¤erently from other cartels, a bottom cartel optimally produces only its top-
quality variant qh. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under equispaced variants, from (6), for all k = 1; 2; :::; n
best-replies are
pk =
1
4
(pk+1 + pk 1)
which can be written as a second-order di¤erence equation as
pk+1   4pk + pk 1 = 0;
with complementary function
Abk+1   4Abk +Abk 1 = 0:
and whose associated characteristic function possesses two distinct real roots given by
b1 = 2 +
p
3, b2 = 2 
p
3;
implying
pk = A1b
k
1 +A2b
k
2: (20)
Moreover, using the fact that for the bottom quality rm,
p1 =
1
4
p2 =
1
4
(p2 + p0)
we can set
p0 = A1b
0
1 +A2b
0
2 = A1 +A2 = 0
implying
A2 =  A1: (21)
Finally, using the fact that for the top quality rm
pn =
1
2
(pn 1 + )
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we just write
2pn   pn 1 = 
that implies
pn 1 = A1bn 11 +A2b
n 1
2 = A1
 
bn 11   bn 12

= 2A1 (b
n
1   bn2 )  
from which
A1
 
bn 11   bn 12
  2A1 (bn1   bn2 ) +  = 0
and, then,
A1 =
 
2bn1   2bn2   bn 11 + bn 12

As a nal step, we insert coe¢ cients A1 and A2 in (20), obtaining
pk = A1 (b1)
k +A2 (b2)
k = A1 (b1)
k  A1 (b2)k =

 
bk1   bk2

p
3bn1 +
p
3bn2
;
for every k = 1; 2; :::; n and b1 =
 
2 +
p
3

and b2 =
 
2 p3, which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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